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Abstract
Even as the International Criminal Court undertakes investigations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, policymakers and academics continue to debate what the “right” tools
to respond to past atrocities are. Naturally there are concerns that justice must be done, weighed
against concerns that weak States will be destabilized by attempts at accountability. While many
have celebrated the entry into force of the International Criminal Court Statute and the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, the United States continues to challenge both of these tools of international
justice as undemocratic and illegitimate. There are also reasons to be concerned that tools of international*473 justice, operating as they do very far from the victims and sites of the original crimes,
may simply fail to accomplish what we hope for. The ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are both being encouraged to complete work by 2008 –they have prosecuted
relatively few cases over the course of more than a decade, but have contributed significantly to the
corpus of international law. International justice may be developing, but it has its limits. Yet, it is
also the case that after civil war or internal atrocity, domestic courts are often unable or unwilling
to seriously pursue cases. This leaves a potential gap, one that some believe can be filled by a
device between the national and the international–hybrid or mixed–tribunal. While these tribunals
are said by some to be an example of “right-sizing” international justice, the case of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”, “the Court,” or “Special Court”) suggests that, perhaps, we ought
not be so sanguine. While perhaps a necessary compromise, the Court suffers from the limits of
being a partially domestic court, in terms of resources and mandate, but also from the limits of
being a partially international court, in that it is viewed by many as foreign. Understanding the
workings of different justice mechanisms is, importantly, more than a concern for lawyers these
days: It is centrally bound up with any discussion of effective conflict resolution, war termination,
and longer term peace implementation.

WRONG-SIZING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE?
THE HYBRID TRIBUNAL IN SIERRA LEONE
Chandra Lekha Sriram*
INTRODUCTION: WHAT SIZE SHOULD INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE BE?
Even as the International Criminal Court undertakes investigations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo,
policymakers and academics continue to debate what the "right"
tools to respond to past atrocities are. Naturally there are concerns that justice must be done, weighed against concerns that
weak States will be destabilized by attempts at accountability.'
While many have celebrated the entry into force of the International Criminal Court Statute2 and the exercise of universal jurisdiction,3 the United States continues to challenge both of these
tools of international justice as undemocratic and illegitimate.4
There are also reasons to be concerned that tools of interna* Dr. Chandra Lekha Sriram is Professor of Human Rights at the University of East
London School of Law. She is the author of CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE VS. PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION (2004), and GLOBALISING JUSTICE FOR
MASS ATROCITIES: A REVOLUTION IN ACCOUNTABILITY (2005). The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the British Academy for field research in Freetown, Sierra
Leone, during summer 2004 under Grant No. SG-3725; the author also gratefully acknowledges the time and space granted by the Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio Study
and Conference Center, which aided immeasurably in the writing process.
1. The literature on the subjects of both transitional justice and international criminal accountability is too expansive to be fully cited here. Important works include, to
note just a few, STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (2001);
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:

How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES

(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); PRISCILLA HARMER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE
TERROR AND ATROCITY (2001); and RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE
IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR (2002). Most have been works of international lawyers or
policy analysts, although mainstream political science has begun to address these issues
more directly. See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of InternationalJustice, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5 (2004).
2. See David Davenport, The New Diplomacy, POL'Y REv., Dec. 2002 & Jan. 2003,
http://www.policyreview.org/dec02/davenport.html; see also Richard Bilder, Recent
Books on InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (2002); LAwYERs COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (now HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST), UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: MEETING THE CHALLENGE
THROUGH NGO COOPERATION (2002), available at http://www.humanrights first.org/
international-justice/wcontext/meeting-challenge3lO5O2.pdf.
3. See generally UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 2.
4. On the "undemocratic" objection, see Madeline Morris, The DisturbingDemocratic
Defect of the InternationalCriminal Court, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 109, 112 (2001).
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tional justice, operating as they do very far from the victims and
sites of the original crimes, may simply fail to accomplish what
we hope for.5 The ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are both being encouraged to complete
work by 2008 6-they have prosecuted relatively few cases over
the course of more than a decade, but have contributed significantly to the corpus of international law.' International justice
may be developing, but it has its limits. Yet, it is also the case
that after civil war or internal atrocity, domestic courts are often
unable or unwilling to seriously pursue cases. This leaves a potential gap, one that some believe can be filled by a device between the national and the international-hybrid or mixed-tribunal. While these tribunals are said by some to be an example
of "right-sizing" international justice, the case of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL", "the Court," or "Special Court")
suggests that, perhaps, we ought not be so sanguine.' While perhaps a necessary compromise, the Court suffers from the limits
of being a partially domestic court, in terms of resources and
mandate, but also from the limits of being a partially international court, in that it is viewed by many as foreign.9 Understanding the workings of different justice mechanisms is, importantly, more than a concern for lawyers these days: It is centrally
bound up with any discussion of effective conflict resolution, war
termination, and longer term peace implementation.' 0

5. See generally Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches
to Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301 (2003).
6. See S.C. Res. 1503, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); see also S.C. Res.
1534, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
7. See generally YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
FROM THE AD Hoc TRIBUNALS TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2004);
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY (Gideon
Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003).
8. See generally Beth K Dougherty, Right-Sizing InternationalCriminalJustice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 80 INT'L AFF. 311 (2004).
9. See Denis Bright, The Conflict and the World, Address at the Conflict, Development
and Peace Network ("CODEP") Conference (June 18-20, 2001), available at http://
www.c-r.org/pubs/occ-papers/slcnflct.shtml.
10. This literature, too, is burgeoning. Important works include: BARBARA WALTER, COMMITING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS (2002); ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS (Stephen John Stedman
et al. eds., 2002); and PEACEBUILDING AS POLITICS: CULTIVATING PEACE IN FRAGILE SOCIETIES (Elizabeth M. Cousens & Chetan Kumar eds., 2001).
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WHAT IS A HYBRID COURT?
A hybrid court is a novel development in international attempts at accountability for past offenses.1" Unlike the international ad hoc criminal tribunals or the International Criminal
Court, a hybrid court is not purely a creation of the international
community, employing international law and international prosecutors andjudges. "2 It is also distinct from domestic processes,
such as prosecutions or commissions of inquiry, in that it does
not solely utilize domestic judges and law.13 Instead, it is an attempt to address the limitations of domestic and international
models, utilizing a complex mix-determined on a case-by-case
basis-of domestic and international law and domestic and international judges and staff.14 A hybrid court theoretically runs
less of a risk of being subject to political pressures, or compelled
to use limited, antiquated, or unjust laws, as domestic courts
might do alone.1 5 It is also less likely to be removed from the
circumstances where the crimes occurred, which should assist
the hybrid court not only in obtaining information and witnesses, but also in serving to inform and educate the populace at
large, and perhaps help to build the capacity of collapsed domestic legal institutions.1 6 Thus, in many instances, it is considered the "right size" of justice.
Proponents of the mixed or hybrid tribunal argue that it
may offer the best of both national and international justice. 7
They suggest that hybrid tribunals, which are composed of domestic and international judges and often utilize a combination
of domestic and international law, can evade the risk of political
manipulation that domestic courts face and that, unlike international tribunals, they are better suited to the needs of countries
emerging from conflict.1 " However, while in principle this logic
is appealing, in practice hybrid tribunals have proven flawed.
11. See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J INT'L L. 295, 30608 (2003).
12. See id. at 298.
13. See id.; see also Nancy Kaymar Stafford, A Model War Crimes Court: Sierra Leone, 10
ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMp. L. 117, 135, 140, 142 (2003).
14. See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 295, 298-300; see also Stafford, supra note 13, at
135, 140, 142.
15. See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 301-06.
16. See id. at 302-04; see also Stafford, supra note 13, at 133-34.
17. See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 298; see also Stafford, supra note 13, at 138.
18. See Stafford, supra note 13, at 141.
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This Essay examines the experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which represents an important commitment of the
international community to post-conflict justice, and which has
produced important judicial decisions, but which does not appear to otherwise fulfill the great hopes of hybrid tribunal advocates.
The Special Court Experiment
The history of the conflict in Sierra Leone is well known
and need not be rehearsed here in any detail.19 Conflict between the government and the Revolutionary United Front
("RUF") erupted in 1991 and endured for over a decade, resulting in an estimated 50,000 to 75,000 deaths and widespread
atrocities, including mutilation and sexual violence. 20 The conflict was notable also for the widespread use of child combatants-often abducted and drugged-who were both victims and
perpetrators of abuses.2 1 It appeared that the conflict might finally end when negotiations in 1999 resulted in the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary Unified Front of Sierra Leone ("Lom6 Accord" or
"Abidjan Accord"), and the mandate by the United Nations
("U.N.") Security Council for a peacekeeping force, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL") .22 The accord
provoked concern from the international community for its inclusion of an amnesty for crimes committed during the con19. See generally JOHN HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY (2001). On the regional dimensions of the conflict, see Michael Pugh et
al., Sierra Leone in West Africa, in WAR ECONOMIES IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT 91 (2004);

Comfort Ero & Jonathan Temin, Sources of Conflict in West Africa, in EXPLORING SUBREGIONAL CONFLICT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION 141 (Chandra Lekha
Sriram & Zoe Nielsen eds., 2004); and WEST AFRICA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES: BUILDING
PEACE IN A TROUBLED REGION (Adekeye Adebajo & Ismail Rashid eds., 2004).
20. See Sheryl Dickey, Sierra Leone: Diamonds for Arms, 7 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 9

(2000).
21. See Chante Lasco, News from the International Criminal Tribunal, 10 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 26, 27 (2002).

22. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lom6 Accord], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/abujaagreement.html; see also U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL), S.C. Res. 1270, UN Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999), available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdfOpenElement.
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flict,23

and the U.N., which acted as a "moral guarantor" of the
agreement, issued a reservation indicating that it did not consider the amnesty provision to cover international crimes. 24 Despite the agreement, fighting and atrocities continued, along
with attacks on UNAMSIL. In May of 2000, the notorious RUF
leader Foday Sankoh was captured, leading to discussions of the
possibility of an international or other tribunal to prosecute him
and other war criminals. 25 ThatJune, the government asked the
U.N. to set up a court to try such cases.2 6
Ultimately, a complex system of a commission of inquiry
and a mixed tribunal was created to address accountability for
past abuses. 27 While both institutions are too new to assess prop-

erly, it is worth examining their features briefly and considering
the prospects for success. Certainly, the relevance of proceedings in the tribunal is of concern to many in the international
community who seek to support it. This would suggest that the
international community has recognized key concerns from the

Timorese experience. 2

Whether a mixed tribunal can sur-

mount problems, such as the disconnect between international
and local processes, and a lack of understanding by, or inclusion
of, the local population, remains to be seen. The SCSL may well
prove an interesting test case. Because the Court is unique in
several respects, any discussion of its potential or potential limitations must begin with key features of the institution itself.
General Mandate of the Court
The U.N. created the Special Court through an agreement
with the government of Sierra Leone and pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315 in August 2000.29 As discussed
23. See Celina Schocken, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 436, 441 (2002).
24. See id.; see also Lom6 Accord, supra note 22, art. 34.
25. See Stephanie H. Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of
Sierra Leone FindJustice in its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 537, 557-58 (2002).
26. See id. at 558.
27. See Special Court Agreement, 2002 Ratification Act, 2002, Supplement to Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXXIII, No. 22 (Apr. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Ratification Act
2002], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-ratificationact.pdf (outlining
the administration of the Special Court for Sierra Leone). See generally Abdul TejanCole, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Conceptual Concerns and Alternatives, 1 AR. HuM.
Ris. L.J. 107 (2001).
28. See Sriram, supra note 5, at 419-20.
29. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Le-
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below, it is worth noting that, in this instance, the Council was
not acting in Chapter VII mode.3" The Court's statute, completed on January 16, 2002, gives it the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
national and international humanitarian law since November 30,
1996. "1 The crimes within the ambit of the Court include crimes
against humanity, violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II, other serious violations
of international humanitarian law, and crimes under national
law. 2 In March 2002, the agreement for the Court was formally
3
ratified. 1
Eight to eleven judges of mixed international backgrounds
sit on the Court.3 4 Following the agreement between the U.N.
and the government of Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber is to
consist of three judges-one appointed by the government and
two by the U.N. Secretary-General-based on nominations from
Member States.3 Any additional Trial Chambers will be similarly composed . 3 6 Five judges are to serve on the appeals chamber, of whom two will be selected by the government and three
by the Secretary-General 7
Relation to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The establishment of the Special Court was nearly contemone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Introduction (Jan. 16,
2002) [hereinafter Special Court Agreement], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scslagreement.html; S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
30. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter allows the Security Council to make
determinations about the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression," and to either make "recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter art.
39, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm.
31. Statute of the Special Court, art. 1 (Jan. 16, 2002), Annex to the Agreement
Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Special Court Statute], available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html. For the date of completion of the Statute of the
Special Court, see Ratification Act 2002, supra note 27, art. 1.
32. See Special Court Statute, supra note 31 arts. 2-5.
33. See Ratification Act 2002, supra note 27.
34. See Special Court Statute, supra note 31, art. 12.
35. See id.
36. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 46, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915
(Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Establishment Report] (recommending two Trial Chambers, each composed of three judges).
37. See Special Court Statute, supra note 31, art. 12.
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poraneous with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission ("TRC" or "Commission") .1 In principle, their responsibilities do not overlap and there ought not be any conflicts between the two institutions. 9 The Commission, as is common for commissions of inquiry, does not have the power to
punish, but rather to investigate the causes, nature, and extent
of the violence, and also to make recommendations regarding
reparations and legal, political, and administrative reform.4 °
Concerns remain, however, about the handling of evidence and
witnesses in particular. 4' There was a possibility that evidence
disclosed to the Commission, which has different remit and evidentiary requirements, could also be brought before the Court;
while the Court's prosecutor foreclosed that option, many believe it is still a risk.4 2 Care must be taken to ensure that the
introduction of such evidence does not violate due process, and
that those who provide evidence are not endangered. Alternatively, it may be the case that in an attempt not to overlap with
the Commission, the Court impedes its work-in several instances indictees held by the Court have not been allowed to
testify before the Commission, leading to tensions, as discussed
in the controversy surrounding Sam Hinga Norman below."
Perceptions of the TRC, as of the Court, have been mixedwhile some view it as an important institution with greater national ownership, difficulties with outreach and management
have engendered significant criticisms.44
38. See Lom Accord, supra note 22, art. 6 (mandating the establishment within
two weeks of the singing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone of a Commission for the
Consolidation of Peace, which must set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
See generally Laura Hall & Nahal Kazemi, Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra
Leone, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287 (2003) (discussing the concurrent establishment of the
two statutes and their relationship to one another).
39. Compare Lom6 Accord, supra note 22, passim with Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Act 2000,
6 (Feb. 22, 2000), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/
Laws/2000-4.pdf.
40. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, supra note 39,
6-8, 15.
41. See Schocken, supra note 23, at 452-53.
42. See id. at 456.
43. See Kim Lanegran, The First Two Years of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
19-20 (Mar. 17, 2004) (paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual
Convention, on file with author).
44. See Interview with Wilfred Bangora, Nat'l Forum for Human Rights, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 15, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Bangora] (not for attribution, on file with author); see also Interview with David Crane, Prosecutor of the Spe-
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Some, such as the Special Court Prosecutor David Crane,
believe that operating the Commission and Court more or less
simultaneously was a positive and innovative choice.4 5 Others,
however, suggested that this simultaneous operation undermined the work of one or the other, or of both, institutions.4 6 In
particular, as discussed below, there were fears that the belief
that the Court would use evidence presented before the TRC
would prevent certain actors from testifying, or testifying fully
and truthfully, before that institution. Initially, fears about sharing evidence prevented some perpetrators from testifying before
the TRC, although such fears subsided over time.4 7 Many participants in and witnesses to the TRC process, however, have
noted that those who testified often did not testify fully, and that
often perpetrators who confessed to serious abuses exhibited no
remorse or desire for forgiveness.4" They have suggested thatin contrast to the South African TRC, which had the capacity to
cial Court for Sierra Leone, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (july 6, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Crane] (not for attribution, on file with author). In particular, many of the
Sierra Leonean commissioners were viewed as demonstrating bias in favor of the government and its supporters during the hearings. Interviews with NGO and United Nations ("U.N.") officials, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (july 2004). For a variety of perspectives on the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL") and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission ("TRC"), see Nat'l Forum for Human Rights, Report on Monitoring the
Two Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra Leone
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) (July 2004) (copy on file with author).
45. See generally Interview with Crane, supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., Interview with Derek Smith, Second Sec'y of Press & Pub. Affairs, British High Comm'n, in Sierra Leone (July 13, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Smith]
(not for attribution, on file with author); Interview with Desmond Molloy, Officer in
charge of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Section at the U.N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL"), in Sierra Leone (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Molloy] (not for attribution, on file with author); Interview with
Robin Vincent, Registrar, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone (July 12, 2004)
[hereinafter Interview with Vincent] (not for attribution, on file with author). Some
suggested that the operation at the same time was not necessarily bad, but that it ought
not have been allowed to occur accidentally, as it did in Sierra Leone, but only if done
by careful design. See Interview with Bert Theuermann, UNAMSIL Child Prot. Adviser,
in Vienna, Austria (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Theuermann] (not for
attribution, on file with author).
47. See Interview with Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 13, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Edwin] (not for attribution, on file with author).
48. See Interview with Theuermann, supra note 46; see also Interviews with Several
Sierra Leonean Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs"), in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2004) [hereinafter Interviews with NGOs] (not for attribution, on file with
author); see also Nat'l Forum for Human Rights, supra note 44, at 8. Many who testified
did so in the hope of receiving some reparations or remunerations and were disap-
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grant amnesty, and with the possibility of domestic legal proceedings in the background as leverage in South Africa-the Sierra Leonean TRC was unable to offer incentives, whether positive or negative. 49 Not only, they suggest, was there no threat,
given the Lom6 Accord amnesty's internal validity of prosecutions, but there was also no possibility of compensation or reparation for victims, as was available in the South African case.5 °
These shortcomings led some to question whether the TRC
had advanced or would advance reconciliation in the country, or
even to suggest that it was more likely to open old wounds than
to support reconciliation. 1 Many also criticized the delay in the
delivery of the TRC's report, due initially in March but delayed
until September 2004, arguing that while the TRC was operational, it had drawn some interest, but with the cases proceeding
in the Court and the delay of publication of the report, interest
in the latter had waned. 2
The Court's Mandate, and Relationship to National Authorities
The Special Court is an exceptional institution, meaning
that it is not part of the country's regular judiciary.5 It is unusual, too, in that it addresses not only crimes under international
law, but also some crimes under Sierra Leonean law.5 4 It is different from other mixed processes, which were grafted onto existing domestic court systems and utilized international judicial
staff.55 The judicial system of Sierra Leone was simply too decimated for such an option to be available;5 6 there was also the
standard concern that any prosecution might be viewed as bipointed at not receiving these; others, such as President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, were
seen as using their own testimony as a political platform.
49. See Interviews with United Nations ("U.N.") Officials and Local NGOs, in New
York, New York and Freetown, Sierra Leone (June &July 2004) [hereinafter Interviews
with U.N. and NGOs] (not for attribution, on file with author).
50. See id.
51. See Nat'l Forum for Human Rights, supra note 44, at 34.
52. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47.
53. See Ratification Act 2002, supra note 27, art. 11(2).
54. See Daniel Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision
in the LomW PeaceAgreement on theJurisdictionof the Special Courtfor SierraLeone, 27 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 347, 360-61 (2001).
55. See Suzannah Linton, Cambodia,East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in InternationalJustice, 12 CuM. L.F. 185, 233 (2001); see also Tejan-Cole, supra note 27, at 124.
56. See Linton, supra note 55, at 233-34.
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ased or as the victor'sjustice." Offenses prosecuted before it are
not, as the ratification act explicitly states, prosecuted in the
name of the country. 8 The Court can request assistance from
the Attorney-General, to identify and locate persons, serve documents, arrest or detain, or transfer persons to the Court.5 9 Conversely, the Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General may
make requests to the Court for assistance in transmitting statements and other evidence, and questioning persons detained by
60
the Court.
The Court is unique in that it has concurrent jurisdiction
with primacy over the courts of Sierra Leone. 61 This means that
upon the Court's request, domestic courts must relinquish cases
to it. 62 A much-debated exception are instances where crimes
are alleged to have been committed by peacekeepers and related
personnel, in which case the State sending the personnel will
have primary jurisdiction.63
The Court's Power and Funding
An immediately apparent weakness of the Court lies in its
mandate. Because the Court was created by agreement between
the U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone 64 -rather than
through a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII, as
were the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda 6 5-the Court is weak in two senses. First,
the Court does not have the authority that the ad hoc tribunals
have to demand extradition of suspects from other countries.6 6
57. See Michelle Sieff, A "Special Court"for Sierra Leone's War Criminals, CRIMES OF
WAR PROJECT: THE TRIBUNALS (May 2001), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/
tribun-mag/sierra-print.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006); see also Tejan-Cole, supra note
27, at 124.
58. See Ratification Act 2002, supra note 27, art. 13.
59. See id. art. 15.
60. See id. art. 19.
61. See Robert Cryer, A "Special Court"for Sierra Leone?, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 435,
439-40 (2001); see also Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy:
Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 391, 416 (2001)
62. See Cryer, supra note 61, at 43940.
63. See id. at 440.
64. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 29.
65. See Schocken, supra note 23, at 447 nn.86-89.
66. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 416; see also Sarah Williams, The Cambodian
ExtraordinaryChambers-A DangerousPrecedentfor InternationalJustice?, 53 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 227, 231 (2004).
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This means that indictees who seek asylum elsewhere, such as
former President of Liberia Charles Taylor, can evade prosecu6 7
tion if the sheltering States do not choose to extradite them.
The Sierra Leonean conflict had regional dimensions, involving
its neighbors as both targets and combatants; 68 yet, the jurisdic69
tion of the Court is limited to the territory of Sierra Leone,
meaning that even if it had the power to compel extradition, it
could not consider cases arising from events taking place outside
the country, even if they involved atrocities related to the conflict. 70 Given that the Court will seek to try higher-level defendants and will pursue only about a dozen of those, such high-pro71
file holdouts clearly undermine it.
Second, because the Court was not created using Chapter
VII powers, it is not the beneficiary of assessed (compulsory)
U.N. contributions by Member States.7 2 Instead, the Court must
solicit voluntary contributions, 7 despite the request by the U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, that the Court be financed
through assessed contributions. 74 As a result, the Court was
scaled back: While initially the budget was to be US$30.2 million
for the first year and US$84.4 million for the next two years, it is
now set at US$16.8 million for the first year and only US$57 million total for the first three years. 75 By way of comparison, the
annual budgets of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda are approximately US$96 and US$80
million, respectively. 76 Such financial constraints were clearly a
factor in the limited scope of trials planned.7 7
67. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 417; see also Bruce Zagaris, European Parliament Passes Resolution Callingfor Action to Ensure Taylor's Court Appearance, 21 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. RP. 200 (2005) (discussing Nigeria's grant of asylum to Taylor and refusal of extradition).
68. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 417.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Chris Tenove, Diamonds, Trials & "SavagePit,"ToaoN'rO STAR,July 17, 2005,
at A12.
72. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 416-18. Endowing the SCSL with Chap. VII
powers strengthens "legal arguments that the Special Court is an organ of the U.N.,
afforded Security Council powers and so therefore entitled to an assessed share of the
U.N.'s budget." Id. at 416-17.
73. See id. at 418.
74. See Schocken, supra note 41, at 453-54.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
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The Court has been unable to raise even the reduced
budget through voluntary contributions.7" At the time of interviews conducted in July of 2004 in Freetown, the Court had only
an operating budget through December of 2004, even though it
is mandated to continue work through December of 2005. 7 9
The Court faced a shortfall for 2004 as well, which was filled
through relatively unique action by the U.N. General Assembly's
Fifth Committee, taking monies for the Court from a little
known "subvention fund"-unallocated assessed contributions.8 0
Over US$16 million was released for the Court in 2004, and
some US$30 million remains in the fund; it was expected that
the subvention fund will be drawn upon to support the Court's
work in 2005 as well. 8 1
Limited Time Frame
The determination of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court
was made for both pragmatic and political reasons. Given the
scale of atrocities and the duration of the conflict, the U.N. Secretary-General determined that it would not be feasible for the
Court to address atrocities stretching back to 1991.82 Further,
there is much dispute as to the exact date of initiation of the
conflict. The date of termination of the Court's jurisdiction,
however, is indeterminate, as the hostilities were ongoing at the
time of the Court's creation.83 While a number of dates for the
start ofjurisdiction were proposed, some were politically tendentious because they excluded key events. 4 Ultimately, the date
78. See

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA

41 (2004) [hereinafter BRINGING JUSTICE], available at http://hrw.org/reports/2OO4/sierraleoneO904/sierraleone0904.pdf.
79. See James Cockayne, The FrayingShoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FoRIuHAm INT'L L.J. 616 (2005); see alsoAdvisory Comm. on Admin. & Budgetary
Questions, Request for a Subvention to the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 4, U.N. Doc. A/
58/7/Add.30 (Mar. 17, 2004).
80. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and
TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 1 43 n.9, delivered to the Security
Counci4 U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
81. See Interview with Smith, supra note 45; see also Interviews with Court Staff, in
Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 12, 2004) [hereinafter Interviews with Court Staff] (not
for attribution, on file with author).
82. See SCSL Establishment Report, supra note 35, 1 25, 26.
83. See id. 1 28.
84. See id. 17 26, 27.
LEONE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS, AND NEEDED SUPPORT
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selected was November 30, 1996, the date of the signing of the
85
Abidjan accord, the first comprehensive peace agreement.
Even this date, however, has proven controversial, as prior to this
date the fighting and atrocities remained largely in rural areas; it
was only after such date that the fighting reached Freetown. 6
Some in Sierra Leone have argued that this unfairly implies that
only atrocities occurring in Freetown matter.17 Others have argued that the open-ended jurisdiction is also flawed, and that
the Court should not have been established while hostilities were
88
underway.
Child Soldiers
As already noted, the conflict in Sierra Leone was characterized by the use of child combatants. As such, children were both
victims and perpetrators, and the statute of the Court reflects
that complicated fact.8 0 The statute provides for the possibility
of prosecuting child perpetrators of atrocities between the ages
of fifteen and eighteen, and also criminalizes the forcible recruitment of children for combat.9 0 The possibility that individuals under the age of eighteen might be prosecuted by the Court
raised serious concerns among human rights advocates and ran
counter to the apparent standard set by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which limited jurisdiction of that
court to those over the age of eighteen.9 ' Many were concerned
that judicial proceedings would not help to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child combatants-many of whom were forcibly
recruited and were victims themselves-but further marginalize
85. See id. For the full text of the peace agreement, see Peace Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone, Nov. 30, 1996, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/abidjanaccord.html.
86. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 411-12; see also Tejan-Cole, supra note 27, at
116.
87. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 411-12; see also Tejan-Cole, supra note 27, at
116.
88. See Tejan-Cole, supra note 27, at 126 n.99.
89. See generally Michael A. Corriero, Involvement and Protection of Children in Truth
and Justice-SeekingProcesses: The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
337 (2002) (discussing the challenge of reintegrating into society the over 5,000 children conscripted into the war and the country's role in this process).
90. See Special Court Statute, supra note 30, arts. 4, 7.
91. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 26, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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them. 2 However, the concern now appears to be moot, as the
Special Court's prosecutor, David Crane, announced in November of 2002 that he would not bring any cases against those between fifteen and eighteen years of age. 3
The Court has faced the challenge of dealing with child
soldiers as perpetrators of crimes but also as victims of crimes of
both forcible and voluntary recruitment.9 4 While forcible recruitment is clearly criminal, there was a dispute before the
Court about the prohibition of voluntary recruitment and about
whether such prohibition also constituted a crime.9 5 The Court,
in response to a jurisdictional objection, found that recruitment
of child soldiers was not only prohibited in international law, but
that there had been a crystallization of a norm whose violation
would attract individual criminal accountability.9 6
Dispute Over the Validity of the Lom6 Amnesty
The establishment of the Court has had significant ramifications for the controversial amnesty embedded in the Lom6 Accord. 7 Article 10 of the Court's Statute provides that any amnesty for the crimes covered in the Statute would not be a bar to
prosecution. 8 Were a blanket amnesty still in force, it would
radically contract the Court's temporary jurisdiction to crimes
committed only after the signing of the accord in 1999. Several
92. See Corriero, supra note 89, at 348-53 (discussing the issues surrounding the
possible persecution of children and difficulties of rehabilitation and reintegration); see
also SCSL Establishment Report, supra note 35, 1 35; Office of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General for Children & Armed Conflict, entry for Sierra Leone, April
29-30, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/English/SierraLeone.html (noting the marginalization of Sierra Leonian youth, who increasingly feel "used, discouraged and abandoned" and become victims of drug abuse).
93. See Sierra Leone: Special Court Will Not Indict Children-Prosecutor,INTEGRATED
REG'L INFO. NETWORK, Nov. 4, 2002, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=
30752&SelectRegion=westAfrica&SelectCountrySIERRALEONE.
94. See generally Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision
on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (May 31,
2004) (holding that the Article 4 of the Special Court Statute grants the Court authority
to prosecute persons who commit serious violations of international humanitarian law),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-04-14-AR72 (E)-131-7383.pdf.
95. See id. 1 10-24 (reviewing International Conventions and Customary International law prohibiting forcible and/or voluntary recruitment of children under the age
of 18); see also Alison Smith, Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2J.
INr'L CrIM. JUST. 1141, 1142 (2004).
96. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E),
17, 30, 38.
97. See Macaluso, supra note 54, at 348.
98. See Special Court Statute, supra note 31, art. 10.
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arguments, however, have been advanced against the amnesty's
constraining prosecutions by the Court. First, as noted above,
the U.N. issued a reservation at the time the accord was signed,
indicating that the amnesty could not cover international crimes
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or other
serious violations of international humanitarian law.99 The argument was thus made that to the degree that the amnesty was
valid, it was valid only in respect of domestic crimes. Furthermore, the U.N. was not party to the agreement, but ratheralong with a number of other institutions and governmentsagreed to act as guarantor of the agreement. 10 0 Thus, it argued,
the amnesty provision was not in breach of any agreements in
the creation of the Court.10 1 The government of Sierra Leone
was, however, a party to the Lom6 Accord, and it had entered
0 2
into a contract with the U.N. for the creation of the Court.1
The government has argued, as have others, that the amnesty
provision was nullified by the continued violation of the peace
accord, through fighting and atrocities, on the part of the
RUF.10 3 In March of 2004, the Court itself considered the validity of the amnesty provision and of Article 10.104 It found that
the Lomi Accord could not be considered a treaty, and that the
amnesty contained in the Lom6 Accord would, therefore, only
have domestic effect and would be regulated by domestic law.10 5
Consequently, it could have no effect upon an international
court. 106

Dispute Regarding Head of State Immunity and the Legality of
the Court Agreement
The unsealing of the SCSL's indictment of then-President
99. See SCSL Establishment Report, supra note 36, 1 23-24; see also S.C. Res. 1315,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
100. See Lome Accord, supra note 22, art. 34.
101. SeeShocken, supra note 23, at 450-51 (contrasting the involvement of the U.N.
in the creation of the Court and the Lom6 Accord with the involvement of the Government of Sierra Leone).
102. See Special Court Statute, supra note 31, intro.
103. See Macaluso, supra note 54, at 372. For criticism of these arguments, see id.
at 372-74.
104. See Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge toJurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty (Mar.
13, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF-decisions.html.
105. See id. 86.
106. See id.
86, 88.
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of Liberia Charles Taylor while he was attending peace negotiations in Ghana shocked many in the international community.'0 7
Rather than arrest Taylor, Ghana allowed him to leave the country; Taylor has since gone into hiding in Nigeria."°8 Nigeria refuses to surrender him to the SCSL, having granted him "asylum," although in June 2004, the Nigerian High Court decided
to review that asylum.10 9 The Nigerian High Court has, however,
said that it would honor a request for extradition from a permanent-rather than the current interim-Liberian government. 1 ° Taylor's attorneys have filed legal challenges to the
Court's jurisdiction over him at the Court itself and at the International Court of Justice ("ICJ").' " The ICJ has yet to hear the
case filed, in which Taylor claims that proceedings against him
violate head of state immunity and requests the immediate cancellation of the arrest warrant.1 1 2 The Court will not take any
action with respect to this filing, however, unless Sierra Leone
consents to the Court's jurisdiction in the case." 3 Taylor's lawyers have also challenged the Court's jurisdiction in a filing
before the Liberian Supreme Court against the SCSL and the
Liberian Ministry of Justice, challenging the legality of searches
of homes of Taylor and his associates.' 1 4 They have argued that
107. See Vanguard, Nigeria; Charles Taylor: The Continuing Tale of a Bungle, AFRICA
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2003; see also David White, Trials Off to Mixed Start SPECIAL WAR CRIMES
COURT: Officials Warn About the Potentialfor Trouble Making, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
14, 2005, at 5. For the text of the indictment, see Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL03-I, Indictment, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-01-I-001.pdf.
108. See Vanguard, supra note 107.
109. See Nigerian High Court Agrees to Review Charles Taylor Asylum, JUST. INITIATIVE,
June 3, 2004, available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res-id=101838;
see also BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 40.
110. See Sierra Leone: Taylor Could Be Tried Upon Request by Liberian Government, INTEGRATED REG'L INFO. NETWORK, June 28, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?
ReportlD=41902&SelectRegion=westAfrica&SelectCountry=SIERRA LEONE; see also
Craig Timberg, Liberian Warlord's Exile Divides His Hosts in Nigeria, WASH. POST, Oct. 10,
2005, at A22.
111. See Press Release 2003/26, Int'l Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to the International Court of Justice in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning an International
Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone Against the Liberian President (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/
ipress2003/ipresscom2003-26_xx_20030805.htm. For the decision of the SCSL in the
Taylor case, see Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity
From Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).
112. See Press Release, supra note 111.
113. See id.
114. See Taylor's Lawyers File Petition Against Special Court, INTEGRATED REG'L INFO.
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the jurisdiction of the Court does not extend beyond the borders of Sierra Leone.1 15 Some Liberian officials have rejected
that argument, claiming that Liberia was obliged to respect foreign courts and proceedings;1 1 6 the Liberian Parliament has,
however, expressly rejected the possibility of allowing Taylor to
face charges before the SCSL. 117
The SCSL has already rejected the challenge to jurisdiction
on immunity grounds. Citing the ICJ's decision in the Yerodia
case,' 18 the Court found that it could have jurisdiction, as it was
an international court created by agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the U.N. rather than a domestic
court.1 1 Should the Liberian Court similarly interpret the SCSL
as an international court, it seems likely to reject the objection
based on lack of territorial jurisdiction.
The legality of the agreement establishing the Court has
been challenged before the Special Court itself and before the
Supreme Court of Sierra Leone. 2 ' The Special Court rejected
the legal challenges, finding that the agreement was valid and
was neither an excess delegation by the U.N. Security Council of
its own powers, nor was it an excess transfer of jurisdiction by
Sierra Leone itself.'2 1 As of mid-2004, hearings regarding the
legality of the agreement continued in the national Supreme
Mar. 16, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=40087&Select
Region=westAfrica&SelectCountry=LIBERIA-SIERRALEONE.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Liberia: ParliamentRejects Petitionfor Taylor to be Tried in Sierra Leone, INTEGRATED REc'L INFO. NETWORK, Aug. 13, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?
ReportID=42068&SelectRegion=west_- Africa&SelectCountry=LIBERIA.
118. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), [2002]
I.C.J. 3, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536.
119. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity
from Prosecution,
35, 40, 42, 50-54 (May 31, 2004), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/
Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf. See generally C. Jalloh, Immunity from Prosecutionfor
InternationalCrimes: The Case of Charles Taylor and the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Oct. 2004, pts. V & VI, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh145.htm.
120. See Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72 (E), Decision on Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court, 1 (May 25,
2004); see also Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Lack of Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lom6 Accord,
I
(May 25, 2004); Interviews with Human Rights Organizations ("HROs") and Other
NGOs, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2004) [hereinafter Interviews with HROs and
NGOs] (not for attribution, on file with author).
121. See Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E),
5, 6.
NETWORK,
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Reception of the Court
A key obstacle for the Court has been the view by many in
Sierra Leone, including its most obvious constituency, human
rights and reform-oriented non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), that the Court is an imposition, either by the government, or the international community, or both. 12' This view appears to have been exacerbated by the indictment of Civil Defence Forces ("CDF") commander Samuel Hinga Norman, still
12 4
viewed by many as a national hero.
The Court as Government Driven
Many human rights advocates view the Court as a purely
government institution, even referring to it as Kabbah's
Court. 1 2 ' This has generated fears that the Court will be merely
a "kangaroo" court. 12 6 Perversely, the view of the Court as government-driven runs in several contradictory directions. On the
one hand, many view with approval the initial government request that a court be created, but only to address the actions of
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("AFRC") and the
RUF. 1 2 7 Yet, simultaneously, many object to the indictment of
Sam Hinga Norman, arguing that he was defending a democratically elected government. 128 This objection bears within it several contradictory strains-many argue that this is the first time
122. See Interview with Lawrence Sesay, Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for
Development and Empowerment ("PRIDE"), in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 15, 2004)
[hereinafter Interview with Sesay] (with supplemental comments from Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment ("PRIDE") staff) (not for attribution, on file with author).
123. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47; see also Interview with Christof Kurz,
Int'l Rescue Comm., in Freetown, Sierra Leone, (July 10, 2004) [hereinafter Interview
with Kurz] (not for attribution, on file with author).
124. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47; see also Interview with Kurz, supra note
123. I discuss this case as well as the dispute between the Court and the TRC regarding
testimony by Hinga Norman at the TRC below.
125. See Interview with Sesay, supra note 122. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is the President of Sierra Leone.
126. See Roundtable Discussion with Members of the Human Rights Clinic, Fourah
Bay Coll., Univ. of Sierra Leone, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 20, 2004) [hereinafter
Roundtable Discussion] (not for attribution, on file with author); see also Interview with
Sesay, supra note 122.
127. See Interview with Sesay, supra note 122.
128. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47.
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that a post-conflict court has addressed the winners-i.e., the
government and the forces defending it-and that this is unacceptable. 129

That is to say, there is a belief that the government

ought not be held accountable. Alternatively, others argue that
Hinga Norman has been made a scapegoat-that if he is responsible for the excesses of his forces, then President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah, to whom he was answerable, must surely also answer
130
himself to the Court.
The Court as International Community Driven
Alternatively, or sometimes simultaneously, detractors of
the Court have argued that it is an institution driven by the international community.1 3 ' They suggest that in contrast to the
TRC, which they portray as a more internal, national structure,
the Court is internationally directed. 132 In particular, they argue
that the dominance of international members in high profile positions, such as that of the registrar and the prosecutor, reinforces the international nature of the Court.13 3 Some have even
suggested that the promotion of the Court is part of the larger
U.S. campaign against the International Criminal Court, as it attempts to demonstrate that alternate models can work.13 4 At the
129. See Interview with Theurmann, supra note 46.
130. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 126; see also Interview with Edwin, supra
note 47.
131. See, e.g., Interview with Kurz, supra note 123; see also Interview with Edwin,
supra note 47.
132. See, e.g., Interview with Edwin, supra note 47.
133. See, e.g., Interview with Kurz; Special Courtfor Foreign Audience Only, THE NEWS
(Freetown), Mar. 19, 2003. Note that this objection may be overstated-the Chief of
the Court's Press and Public Affairs section notes that local press tend not to point out
the nationality of the Prosecutor as they once did, and that the announced departure of
the Registrar, a Briton, was viewed with genuine sadness by local press. Robin Vincent
has since reconsidered his resignation and is staying after being asked to by the U.N.
and several governments, including the government of Sierra Leone. See Interview with
Allison Cooper, Chief of SCSL Press & Pub. Affairs, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 16,
2004) [hereinafter Interview with Cooper] (not for attribution, on file with author). It
is further worth noting that the Deputy Prosecutor was appointed in consultation with
the government of Sierra Leone. See Special Court Gets New Deputy Prosecutor,CONCORD
TIMES (Freetown), July 12, 2005. The registrar was appointed in consultation with the
President of the Special Court. See UN: Secretary-Generaland Government of Sierra Leone
Announce Election of PresidingJudges, Appointment of Registrarfor Special Court, GLOBAL
NEWS WiRE, Dec. 17, 2002. The head of outreach is a Sierra Leonean. See Sierra Leone;
Briefing to the Security Council ly Justice Emmanuel Olayinka Ayoola, President, The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, AFRicA NEWS, May 24, 2005.
134. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47. Such a conspiratorial view may well
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same time, some view the Court not only as internationallydriven, but as a betrayal of the government's initial desire to pursue only the RUF and the AFRC.1 35 They suggest that the Court
has overstepped in pursuing the CDF, while asking why it is, if
responsibility is expanded, that all parties to the conflict are not
responsible for their excesses, including UNAMSIL and the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer
Group ("ECOMOG")."16 It is well worth observing in this regard
that there is little or no evidence to support some of the more
extreme criticisms, but the very fact that they are aired poses a
problem of perception for the Court.
Do Views of the Court Vary by Group Membership?
One might expect distinct perceptions of the Court by various sectors of Sierra Leonean society; in particular, one might
expect that victims perceive it rather differently than do ex-combatants, and that ex-combatants are likely to vary in their views of
the Court according to previous group affiliation. It is still unclear what victims think of the Court, as no large-scale surveys of
their views have been completed thus far. The best approximation of their attitudes comes from assessments of the relevance
of the Court for victims made by human rights and other NGOs
in Freetown. More research has been carried out as to the attitudes of ex-combatants on a host of related issues, such as democracy, participation in the political process, and intention to
return to the use of force, but not directly on the issue of the
be overstated. Note that the American Prosecutor, an avid proponent of the model,
argues not that hybrid tribunals can replace the International Criminal Court ("ICC"),
but that they might be part of the ICC treaty's scheme of complementary jurisdiction,
acting where national courts are unable to act, but in lieu of the ICC where appropriate. See Interview with Crane, supra note 44. This may be, however, in line with the
suggestion by U.S. Ambassador-at-large for war crimes that the ad hoc tribunal must
complete work by 2007 or 2008, and that the United States will provide support for
domestic trials. See Stacy Sullivan, United States Calls for Dissolution of UN War Crimes Tribunals, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2002), available at www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/
news-dissolution.html.
135. See Cockayne, supra note 79, at 642.
136. See generally Roundtable Discussion, supra note 126. A repeated claim in interviews was that most Sierra Leoneans would have been satisfied with seeing prosecutions
of the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("AFRC"); there seemed to be a persistent objection to the idea that all parties,
including government-supported ones, should on principle be subject to the Court's
jurisdiction.
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More general views of ex-combatants regarding the
Court, and in fact the TRC as well, can be gleaned from those
who worked with them in the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration ("DDR") .138 A key benefit of the Court
for victims is perhaps obvious: It allows them to see some measure of justice exacted against those responsible for the harms
that they have suffered. Furthermore, and in contrast to many
trials of human rights perpetrators, victims in Sierra Leone have
the opportunity to see and follow the process because the Court
is in the country. Some can make it to Freetown to follow the
proceedings, while others can follow it, though admittedly less
well, through radio programs on Radio UNAMSIL and informational spots on other radio stations, as well as through innovative
outreach activities in areas up-country that radio and newspapers
do not reach regularly. These include thirty-minute video summaries produced every week and distributed throughout Sierra
Leone's fourteen provinces via mobile video units."'
An additional objection to the Court has been adduced,
however, by human rights and other NGOs, on behalf of the victims. This objection addresses the very mandate of the Court,
seeking accountability for those who "bear the greatest responsibility" for abuses. 4 ' The objection focuses on commanders
rather than direct perpetrators, and the objection, repeatedly, is
137. See Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-August 2003, pts. V.2 & V.3 (2003), available at
http://-.columbia.edu/-mh2245/Reportl-BW.pdf.
138. See generally PosT-CoNFLIcr REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEV. & EMPOWERMENT [PRIDE] & INT'L CTR FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE [ICTJ], EX-COMBATANT VIEWS OF
THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE
(2002) [hereinafter PRIDE & ICTJ], available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/
PRIDE%20report.pdf. It should be noted that the concept has expanded over time,
with additional "R" terms being added, such as rehabilitation, but for the sake of this
analysis, I use the original term. There are some excellent analyses of the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration ("DDR") process in Sierra Leone. See, e.g., Desmond
Molloy, The DDR Process in Sierra Leone: An Overview and Lessons Learned (unpublished draft of manuscript, on file with the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ("DDR") Coordination Section of UNAMSIL) (June 2004); Bengt Ljunggren &
Desmond Molloy, Some Lessons in DDR, The Sierra Leone Experience (June 2004)
(unpublished draft of manuscript, on file with author); Desmond Molloy, Brief, DDR
Coordination Section UNAMSIL for Visit of Security Council to Sierra Leone, June 2425 2004, (unpublished draft of manuscript, on file with author).
139. See Interview with Cooper, supra note 133; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing some of the criticisms of the Court by human rights groups).
140. See Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity and Achieving Justice-Amnesty International's
Message to the National Victims Commemoration Conference (Amnesty Int'l, Paper No. 51/
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that victims wish to know why it is that a commander is in custody, rather than the man who actually cut off a hand, or burned
down a house.'
The criticism is often carried further, suggesting that the interpretation of greatest responsibility is incorrect-that it is those direct perpetrators who in fact do bear it,
not those who 'just" gave orders.142 On this account, the prosecutions at the Court will, therefore, not address the needs of victims, many of whom are said to feel abandoned by the government.143 Many victims and witnesses before the Court have expressed the expectation that they might receive compensation
for their efforts or suffering, but this-with some limited exceptions to cover costs for witnesses-is not feasible;' 4 4 many victims
complain that their needs are not addressed and point to DDR
145
benefits for ex-combatants by contrast.
One might expect that ex-combatants would have a uniform
and negative view of a Court designed to punish their commanders and impliedly condemn their own activities. Given the
complex nature of warring factions in Sierra Leone, however,
the situation is somewhat more complicated. First and foremost,
it is the case that ex-combatants of all groups were suspicious of
the Court, fearing that they themselves would be indicted by
it.' 4 6 This suspicion arguably extended beyond the Court, leading many to fear testifying before the TRC, despite the explicit
announcement by the prosecutor that he would not use testimony to the TRC as evidence for indictments or prosecutions,
but many former fighters simply did not believe him.14 ' This
suspicion, however, may or may not have had a lasting impact on
004/2005 (Public),
GAFR510042005.

2005),

available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/EN-

141. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 20.

142. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47; see also Interview with Bangora, supra
note 44.
143. See Interview with U.N. Official, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 19, 2004)
[hereinafter Interview with U.N. Official] (not for attribution, on file with author).
144. See Interview with Bangora, supra note 44; see also Thordis Ingadottir, Victims
of Atrocities-Access to Reparations, (background paper for the International Conference on War Crimes-Searching for Justice: Comprehensive Action in the Face of
Atrocities, June 4-6, 2003), available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/PICTarticles/WARCRIME.PDF.
145. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47.
146. See PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 138, at 14, 19.
147. See Interview with Sesay, supra note 122. Several human rights observers,
speaking on the condition of anonymity, agreed with this point.
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the work of the TRC-according to some observers, this concern
abated after a few months and they began to testify.' 4 8 Similarly,

there have been concerns that fear of indictment might have de1 49
terred some fighters from engaging in the DDR process.
However, given the extensive nature of the DDR in Sierra Leone,
and the apparently broad-based buy-in to the process, the ultimate effect appears to have been negligible.1 5 ° As already discussed in this Essay, however, the primary objection amongst
some ex-combatants has been the decision to pursue cases
against the CDF, and in particular the case against Sam Hinga
Norman. 151 Former CDF fighters view themselves and Norman
as heroes who defended the democratically elected government,
and resent being called to account. 1 52 This resentment has led
to rumors and fears that supporters of Hinga Norman will seek
to destabilize the country. 153 One editorial in a Freetown paper
expressed its concerns as such: "We only hope this Court will
not leave behind an ugly legacy that will spark another war in
this country. You see, Chief Norman has a very large following
154
that is angry with the treatment currently meted out to him."
Systematic surveys of ex-combatants conducted by a local
NGO with international support, endorse cautious skepticism.
Their analyses find moderate levels of support for the Court and
the TRC, which increases following sensitization or outreach
148. See Interview with Crane, supra note 44. Several human rights observers,
speaking on the condition of anonymity, agreed with this point.
149. See Interview with Molloy, supra note 46; see also PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note
138, at 19.
150. See Interview with Molloy, supra note 148. This fear, however, remains a valid
one for the future. A Special Court team visiting from Liberia in July to provide information about the Court learned that the rumor among some fighters undergoing DDR
was that their cards, issued to provide them access to DDR programs and benefits, had a
secondary purpose-to identify them for indictment before the SCSL. See Interview
with Cooper, supra note 133.
151. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47; see also Sierra Leone War Crimes Trials to
BeginJune 3, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, May 13, 2004, availableat http://www.globalpolicy.
org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2004/051 lstart.htm
152. See PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 138, at 12, 16.
153. See Norman Says: Special Court Lied Against Me, CONCORD TIMES (Freetown),
Jan. 27, 2004, at front page; see also Dsman Benk, As Courthouse Opens Police Clamp Down
on Free Norman Supporters, CONCORD TIMES (Freetown), Mar. 11, 2004; Dsman Benk, For
Talking to Norman Kamajor Administrator Arrested, CONCORD TIMES (Freetown), Jan. 27,
2004.
154. See Watch out, Sierra Leoneans!! The Special Court Could Leave and Ugly Legacy
Behind, THE DEMOCRAT (Freetown), Apr. 2004, at 3.

2006]

WRONG-SIZING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE?

processes. 155 It is worth noting that support of RUF ex-combatants, many of whom see themselves as victims of forcible recruitment and betrayal by their ex-commanders, express relatively
strong support for the Court, as well as willingness to testify. 5 6
Conversely, CDF ex-combatants, the vast majority of whom
joined willingly, and who believe that they helped to defend the
nation and the democratically1 5 7 elected government, express
greater resistance to the Court.
Outreach-Efforts, Limits, and Dealing With
Embedded Prejudices
Given that a notable failure of international tribunals has
been their inability to communicate with the affected society,
and the placement of hybrid tribunals in the territory of the
country where crimes occurred, the importance of outreach for
the SCSL cannot be underestimated. Indeed, the outreach effort has been impressive, but it is also worth noting that it was
limited by at least two factors-one internal and one external.
Outreach has been extensive and quite timely compared to
other tribunals. The outreach for the SCSL began well before
the Court was functional, overlapping with the workings and outreach of the TRC. Indeed, on some occasions, the outreach activities were carried outjointly. Outreach was initially conducted
by the Prosecutors-often by the Prosecutors themselves-who
visited every district in the country in the process.' 5 8 Outreach
offices are present in every province in the country. 1 59 In addition, outreach programs are aired regularly on radio stations
across the country, and outreach officers have established "Accountability Now" clubs in universities and engage in extensive
training of key sectors of civil society on substantive issues
6
around the Court.1 0
155. See Beth K. Dougherty, SearchingforAnswers: Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 AFR. STUD. Q. 39, 48 (2004), available at http://web.africa.ufl.edu/
asq/v8/v8ila3.pdf; see also PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 138, at 16.
156. See id.; see also PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 138, at 11, 16.
157. See PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 138, at 12, 16.
158. See Interview with Binta Mansaray, Outreach Dir., SCSL, in Freetown, Sierra
Leone (July 22, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Mansaray] (not for attribution, on file
with author).
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., E-mail from Patrick Fatoma, Senior Outreach Assoc., SCSL, to Chandra Lekha Sriram, Prof. of Human Rights, East London Sch. of Law (July 28, 2004).
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The Office of the Principal Defender also conducts outreach now that it is operational. 161 However, this development
points squarely to some of the internal limitations of the outreach process. Because outreach was initially largely conducted
by the Prosecutor, this heightened profile generated an identification of the Court with the Prosecution, even though outreach
was formally housed in the Office of the Registrar. 1 62 The creation of a separate Outreach Section came later, with a permanent director appointed in January 2003.163 Similarly, because
the Office of the Principal Defender became operational after
the Office of the Prosecutor, its outreach activities began later,
contributing to the (mis)perception that the Court and the prosecution were one and the same. 164 The Outreach Section and
the Principal Defender have worked assiduously to address this
perception, with the Defender pursuing outreach around the
country and through high-profile appearances to combat this
1 65
early problem.
Outreach also suffered from a perceived lack of importance
or legitimacy within the Court, according to the Outreach Director. 1 6 6 She has suggested that while certain staff, such as the
Registrar and the Prosecutor, recognized the importance of outreach from the outset and pursued it vigorously, many legal staff
did not. 167 This was in part, she has suggested, due to the lack of
prioritization for it in terms of funding-the Court's management committee decided not to fund outreach and thus funding
16
had to be found elsewhere.
Finally, it appears that outreach, and perhaps the image of
the Court generally, suffered from an obstacle beyond its control-embedded biases and preconceptions. For at least some
who view the Court as politicized, it is possible that no amount of
outreach will change their minds. Many respondents suggested,
for example, that ex-combatants fearing testimony before the
TRC would be shared with the Court maintained that fear, not
161. See Interview with Mansaray, supra note 158. The Office of the Principal Defender advises, assists, and represents criminal defendants in the Special Court.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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because they were unaware of the Prosecution's assurances, but
because they did not believe them. 6 9 For this reason, the Outreach Director observed that it is perhaps not surprising that
children receiving outreach at schools were considerably more
receptive to it than many adults. 7 ° Another Court employee
suggested off the record that the Court was very effective at getting information out, but that the perceptions of it within the
country varied significantly, with particular concerns surrounding both the indictment of Hinga Norman and the decision not
to indict President Kabbah. 17 '
The Legacy of the SCSL: Unrealistic Expectations?
A common criticism of international trials is that they fail to
assist national reconciliation and do not contribute to the re-institution of the rule of law.' 72 It might perhaps be hoped that
mixed tribunals, by virtue of functioning within the society affected, can counter the first objection. Significant hopes have
been pinned on the SCSL's capacity to assist in the second as
well.' 73 Recent research by the United Nations Development
Programme ("UNDP") and the International Center for Transitional Justice has indicated that many in Sierra Leone hope that
169. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47; see also Interview with Sesay, supra
note 122. But compare this with the relatively positive effect of sensitization efforts
recorded by PRIDE and ICTJ, and local citizens' willingness to participate in the TRC
process, even if information were to be shared with the Court. See PRIDE & ICTJ, supra
note 138, at 7. The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra
Leone may reflect positive attitudes that declined by the summer of 2004, or may yet
provide a fuller reflection of attitudes than do individual opinions provided in interviews with this author. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE
TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE (2004), available at http://trc-

sierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/index.shtml.
170. See Interview with Mansaray, supra note 158.
171. See Interviews with Court Staff, supra note 81. See discussions of the Hinga
Norman disputes elsewhere in this chapter. Even the decision to grant Hinga Norman's petition to represent himself before the court is viewed with suspicion in some
quarters. See Interview with Sulaiman Jabati, Executive Sec'y, Coal. for Justice & Accountability, in Sierra Leone (July 16, 2004) (not for attribution, on file with author).
For the decision permitting Hinga Norman's self-representation, see Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T-125, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4) (d) of the Statute of the Special Court
(June 8, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-04-14-T-125.pdf.
172. See Chris McMorran, International War Crimes Tribunals, in BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess eds., 2005), available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/int-war crime-tribunals.jsp.
173. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 61, at 403-07.
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the Court will leave behind a greater "legacy" than simply the
record of a few prosecutions. 174 Great-perhaps unrealistichopes are that it will contribute to institution-building in the
country, helping to rebuild a shattered judiciary, revitalize legal
education, and assist in legal reform even as it is expected to
contribute to reconciliation. Many involved in the work of the
Court hope to meet some of these expectations, although there
are real concerns that seeking to do so may divert efforts of
Court staff, and more generally, that the Court is not the appropriate institution to support broader capacity-building in the
75
country.1
First and foremost, there is an expectation that the Special
Court can help to rebuild the shattered judicial system. The
Court is formally separate from the judicial system of Sierra Leone. 176 This separation has created concerns among the members of the Court that they must ensure that they leave a legacy
for the country beyond the specific trials. 177 External actors,
such as donors and the U.N., are also concerned that the Court's
activities serve to benefit and strengthen the domestic legal and
judicial system. 17' This is particularly important in Sierra Leone,
where the court system lacks even the most basic elements, including law reports from past decisions. The system is rife with
funding and morale problems, corruption, and challenges to in179
dependence.
Members of the Court have attempted to engage in outreach to domestic legal authorities, members of civil society
groups, and the law school in Freetown.1 8 This outreach effort
is intended to build basic legal capacity, to explain the role of
the prosecutions and the procedure, and to include the rationale for due process and the need for defense attorneys.18 1 The
relationship of the Court to national justice mechanisms has not
174. See ICTJ & UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], THE "LEGACY"
(draft for discussion)

OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 5-9 (Sept. 29, 2003)

[hereinafter ICTJ & UNDP], availableat http://www.ictj.org/downloads/LegacyReport.
pdf.
175. See id. at 5-7.
176. See id. at 4.
177. See id. at 6-7.
178. See id.
179. See Schocken, supra note 23, at 438; see also ICTJ & UNDP, supranote 174, at 1.
180. See ICTJ & UNDP, supra note 174, at 5-7.
181. See id. at 13-20.
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been consistently positive. The Court has necessarily lured many
talented legal experts away from current or potential roles in the
national legal system. It has also taken land from the Prison
Ser1 2
1
school.
training
new
a
for
intended
land
vice, including
The outreach staff of the Court has also sought to train local
chiefs and other leaders regarding the Court, while simultaneously seeking to make the work of the Court comprehensible
and interesting to those actors.1 8 3 In particular, they have
sought to workshop the links between international legal standards of due process and rule of law and the processes of traditional justice. 8 4 This could prove to be important, as many Sierra Leoneans are little-affected by the formal legal sector, but
do participate in traditional justice.18 5 Simultaneously, however,
some critics have suggested that addressing the crimes of the
past would be better done through traditional modes, such as
purification and cleansing ceremonies, and that, at the very
least, these traditional activities certainly ought to supplement
18
more formal ones.

6

Actors involved in the functions of the Special Courtwhether from UNDP, bilateral donors and the World Bank, or
the judges themselves-are far more concerned with the impact
of the Court on victims, the wider community, and national legal
capacity than has been the case in other externalized or mixed
tribunal experiences.1 8 7 This is certainly a positive development.
There have been, however, negative effects on local capacity,
and outreach is still limited.1 88 The Court is correctly not specifically designed to be a mechanism to build national legal capacity. Concerns should remain, however, if the Court diverts atten182. See Press Release, Press & Pub. Affairs Office, Special Court for Sierra Leone
(Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-101103.html; see
also Special Court Takes Over Prison Camp, AmcA NEWS, Oct. 2, 2002.
183. See Interview with Mansaray, supra note 158.
184. See id.
185. See id.; see also Interview with Alfred Carew, Head of the Nat'l Forum for
Human Rights, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 15, 2004) ) [hereinafter Interview with
Carew] (on file with author).
186. See, e.g., Interview with Carew, supra note 185 (pointing out that many Sierra
Leoneans belong to secret societies that have such rituals to address past harms); see also
AUDE-SOPHIE RODELLA, JUSTICE, PEACE, AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE 120-21 (2003), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/

research/2003/Rodella-Aude-Sophie.pdf.
187. See ICTR & UNDP, supra note 174, at 1-3, 9, 22, 24-25.
188. See id. at 11.
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tion and resources from other domestic needs, as it appears
likely to do. It may be the case that the experience of the Court
will be better than that in East Timor.
What Can the Legacy of the Court Be and What Are Its
Limits? The View from Freetown
There appear to be two divergent views within Freetown
about the possible legacy of the Special Court beyond "leaving
behind a building." While registry and prosecution staff is optimistic about the Court's potential in this regard, many NGOs
and some diplomats are more circumspect, if not frankly pessimistic."' While many agree that the physical infrastructure will,
at least, benefit the local judicial system after the Court vacates
it, even that is a matter of some dispute. 9 °
Robin Vincent, the Court's Registrar, offers three types of
legacy that the Court may leave for Sierra Leone: bricks and
mortar, people (training), and organizational structures. 9 '
Most obviously, the court facility that will remain in Freetown
after the Court completes its work is impressive indeed-it offers
modern courtrooms, an extensive library specializing in international humanitarian and human rights law, a secure and sanitary
detention facility, and office space for the prosecution, defense,
and other staff.' 9 2 With regard to people, despite criticism of the
Court as Western, approximately half of Court staff is Sierra Leonean.1 93 Registry staff are approximately sixty percent Sierra
Leonean, and the Outreach staff are entirely Sierra Leonean;
the finance staff are all African, though not all Sierra Leoneans.194 The detention facility currently employs approximately
forty Sierra Leoneans,' 95 who will bring their training in international standards to the domestic penal system when they return
189. See id. at 5-7, 9-10; see also Cockayne, supra note 79, at 659-63.
190. See Cockayne, supra note 79, at 660.
191. See Interview with Vincent, supra note 46.
192. See ICTJ & UNDP, supra note 174, at 5; see also Press Release, Press & Pub.
Affairs Office, Special Court for Sierra Leone (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.
sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-031004.html. The Royal Institute of British Architects, The
Guild of Architectural Ironmongers Ironmongery Specification Awards 2005 awarded a
commendation to the SCSL facility. For a report on the award, visit http://www.allgood.co.uk/certs/pdf/GAI%202005%20Award%20Pamphlet.pdf.
193. See Interview with Vincent, supra note 46.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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to work there. The internship program endeavors to take on
roughly equal numbers (ten to twelve) of international and national interns, but, in reality, this has proved difficult because of
a lack of Sierra Leonean applicants, although their applications
through local universities have been strongly encouraged.' 96 According to Vincent, while Sierra Leoneans are employed in a
mixture of administrative and professional posts that tilts towards the administrative, there are sixteen Sierra Leoneans in
professional positions across the Court.19 7 Finally, the Court can
bequeath training and proper judicial practice to ajudiciary that
has been notoriously corrupt and subject to political manipulation, and which essentially collapsed during a decade of conflict. 19 8

The Special Court has conducted a survey of the Chief Justice's own office and made key recommendations to aid organization and capacity-building. 9 9 The Court will invite the Attorney General of Sierra Leone to send observers, and has done an
evaluation of key needs of the judiciary for the Chief Justice of
the Special Court.2 °° The Court will invite the Chief Justice to
send national judges to observe proceedings. 20 ' The jurisprudence of the Court itself offers a demonstration of the rule of
law and due process in a country that has seen little of either,
including procedural protections for witnesses and defendants
alike.20 2 Perhaps the greatest legacy is none of the specific benefits suggested above, but that of combating impunity in a country
and a region where it has prevailed, demonstrating that accountability is possible.20 3 They point to the relatively high level of
those indicted by and in the custody of the Court to suggest that
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.; see also HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN MOnON: THE TIAL PHASE
OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 33-35 (2005) [hereinafterJUSTiCE IN MOTION],
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/sierraleone1I05/sierraleone1lO5.pdf.
199. See Interview with Vincent, supra note 46; see also JUSTICE IN MOTION, supra
note 198, at 3.
200. See Interview with Vincent, supra note 46.
201. See id.; see alsoJusTICE IN MOTION, supra note 198, at 35.
202. See Cockayne, supra note 79, at 657-58, 663-74. Even human rights groups
skeptical of the Court have expressed hope that the Court's exclusion of the death
penalty as an option will assist in the campaign to eradicate it domestically. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 126.
203. See Interview with Vincent, supra note 46; see also Interview with Smith, supra
note 46.
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it poses a significant challenge to the "big man" impunity seen to
20 4
be so common in the country.
For each of these prospective benefits of the Court, there
are detractors who say that such benefits are overstated or entirely illusory. Even the structure itself is not without its detractors. Many have argued that the Court facility is an expensive
white elephant-costly to maintain and ill-designed for the functioning of an ordinary judiciary should the domestic courts seek
to move into it. 20 5 Even Vincent recognizes that once the site is
turned over to the national government, it will be costly to maintain.2 ° 6 Some have suggested that the Court ought to have never

been built, that the national law courts and prison facility would
have served the same purposes and had an important symbolic
effect for the country and the bolstering of the judicial system.20 7
Others have suggested that the facility might still be of great use,
but might better be used not by the domestic courts, but as a
training facility, either for the sub-region or for Africa, for international humanitarian and human rights law. 20 ' Alternatively, it
has been reported that the Court might extend its jurisdiction to
Liberia,20 9 or that the site could be used as the site of any Special
2 10
Court for Liberia, both of which are contentious suggestions.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone will not extend its jurisdiction to Liberia, but the site could be used if a Special Court is to
be set up for Liberia. This, however, is speculation only and not
21 1
based on any fact.
Skeptics question whether the Court will have a significant
impact in terms of training personnel who will return to the local judiciary or corrections system, noting that many are likely to
204. See Interview with Crane, supra note 44. This is a benefit imputed by many to
the Court, even by some of its greatest skeptics.
205. See Cockayne, supra note 79, at 660.
206. See Interview with Vincent, supra note 46.
207. See ICTJ & UNDP, supra note 174, at 8, 10.
208. See Cockayne, supra note 79, at 660 n.190.
209. See Interview with Theuermann, supra note 46.
210. See Interviews with U.N. and NGO Staff, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2004)
[hereinafter Interviews with U.N. and NGO Staff] (not for attribution, on file with author).
211. According to Bert Theuermann, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Liberia, Jacques Paul Klein, has suggested that jurisdiction might be so
extended. See Interview with Theuermann, supra note 46. Others have speculated that a
Liberian court might use the SCSL facilities. See Interviews with U.N. and NGO Staff,
supra note 210.
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leave Sierra Leone to reap the benefits of that training, and that
many who do return to domestic work will be disappointed not
only by small salaries, but also by poor working conditions. 2
Some allege that a brain drain has already begun, with many local UNAMSIL staff pursuing opportunities abroad. 2 1' They suggest that, perversely, the legacy might be to deprive Sierra Leone
of many of its most skilled, rather than improving local capacities. 4 Skeptics also doubt that institutional or organizational
capacities will be improved, suggesting that embedded corruption in the judicial and other sectors must first be rooted out,
and that this will be a daunting task.215 Finally, there are some
that doubt that the demonstrative effect of combating impunity
will be significant, pointing out that some of the key "big men"
responsible for atrocities in Sierra Leone are not in the custody
of the Court, as they are either dead, in hiding, or outside of the
country. Western diplomats and human rights NGOs, therefore,
are skeptical about the potential for the Court's legacy, seeing
216
the meaning of the term as "elusive.
Some skeptics go further, worrying that the Court might
well bequeath a "negative" legacy, either because it continues to
be viewed as a political tool, or because the international funding poured into it has a distorting effect not just upon the local
economy, but specifically on the development or reconstruction
2 17
of the weak legal sector.
TIMING AND SECURITY: DID THE COURT BEGIN
OPERATIONS TOO EARLY?
The U.N. peacekeeping operation, UNAMSIL, and the
DDR process have been widely viewed as successful. 21 8 Nonethe212. See Interview with Edwin, supra note 47.
213. See Interview with Smith, supra note 46.
214. See Interviews with HROs and NGOs, supra note 120.
215. See Interviews with a Western Diplomat, Human Rights Organizations and
Other NGOs, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2004) (not for attribution, on file with
author).
216. See id.
217. See Interviews with Court Staff, supra note 81.
218. For a skeptical view that nonetheless recognizes the accomplishments of
UNAMSIL, see CtLvoIO
BERNATH & SAYRE NYCE, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON
THE UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN SIERRA LEONE: UNAMSIL-A PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS,
LESSONS LEARNED (2002), available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/files/3050

fileRIUNAMSIL.pdf; and Molloy, The DDR Process in Sierra Leone, supra note 138.
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less, there were concerns from the outset that the operation of
the Court would begin too early, perhaps undermining DDR if
fighters feared indictment. Happily, these fears do not appear
to have been borne OUt. 2 19 Nonetheless, many skeptical NGO
observers suggest that the Court did begin operation too early,
examining crimes and societal rifts best left to heal; many have
even suggested that a delay of five years or so would have been
appropriate. 22 0 Conversely, the Prosecutor points out that any
delay might have undermined justice, making it more difficult to
obtain perpetrators, witnesses, and evidence; as it stands, one key
perpetrator, Foday Sankoh, died while in custody of the
Court.2 21 As discussed above, the issue of timing has also been
fraught with substantial disagreement as to the viability of oper222
ating a commission of inquiry and a court simultaneously.
After UNAMSIL-Prospects for Peace, Security, and Justice
Individuals interviewed for this research from a variety of
sectors in Sierra Leone expressed pessimism regarding the future of Sierra Leone after the withdrawal of UNAMSIL. 223 This
was often articulated as an expectation that after withdrawal,
fighting would simply resume.2 24 In some instances, this was
couched as likely to come in the form of an attack from
outside, 225 in others as a re-mobilization of combatants.

226

In

general, there was skepticism that the government could or
would provide basic services or address corruption, which were
seen as key "root" causes of the conflict, and there was also far
greater faith in international than national actors to provide for
services and security.2 27 This widespread expectation that con219. See Elections in Sierra Leone: A Step Toward Regional Stability?: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Africa of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 59-76 (2002) (statement
of John Prendergast, co-Director of the Africa Program, International Crisis Group).
But see Interview with Molloy, supra note 46 (stating that the Court impacted DDR by
pushing people underground or out of the country).
220. See Interviews with NGOs, supra note 48.
221. See Interview with Crane, supra note 44.
222. See Interview with Theurmann, supra note 46.
223. See Interview with Kurz, supra note 123; see also Interview with Edwin supra
note 47; Interview with Theurmann, supra note 46.
224. See, e.g., Interview with Theurmann, supra note 46.
225. See Interview with Kurz, supra note 123.
226. See Interview with Theurmann, supra note 46.
227. See Interviews with U.N. Officials, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2004)
[hereinafter Interviews with U.N. Officials] (not for attribution, on file with author).
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flict will resume may also have a dampening effect either upon
the functioning or on impact of the Court-to the degree that
people fear retribution for testifying or otherwise cooperating
with the Court, they are less likely to do so.
A Special Court for Liberia?
Many of the lessons learned from the experiences of the
SCSL may prove to be relevant for any future prosecutions in
Liberia, beyond the issue of the pursuit of Charles Taylor. But
the SCSL might also have a more direct impact upon Liberia. In
addition to discussions of the creation of a similar court for Liberia, the idea has been floated that the Court could itself take up
Liberia-centered cases. 228 Further, there has been some suggestion that the site of the SCSL could be used for any Liberian
court, if created. 229 The perceived linkage to the SCSL in Liberia is such that, according to one interviewee, there is a widespread belief amongst demobilizing Liberian fighters that the
card issued to them entitling them to DDR benefits will also be
used to identify them for indictment before the SCSL.23 ° In the
meantime, the transitional Liberian government announced the
creation of a TRC in November of 2004.2 1' This commission
may become contentious itself, as, according to sources, the
members had been selected in the summer of 2004, well before
any such commission was formally mandated, leading to speculation that it would be biased.2 3 2
CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF
MIXED JUSTICE
I have suggested that mixed tribunals might not be able to
address the flaws of internal and external justice in the ways that
their advocates suggest they might. 233 I then turned to the some228. See Interview with Theuermann, supra note 46.
229. See Interviews with U.N. and NGO Staff, supra note 210.
230. See Interviews with U.N. Officials, supra note 227.
231. Information describing features of the Truth and Reconciliation Act of Liberia may be found at the website of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, www.unmil.
org/images/liberia trc actsummary.pdf.
232. See Interviews with NGO Staff, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2004) (not for
attribution, on file with author); see also INT'L CISIS GROUP, SIERRA LEONE'S TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION:

A

FRESH START?

5 (2002), available at http://www.crisis-

group.org/library/documents/reportarchive/A400858-20122002.pdf.
233. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

what unrealistic expectations placed upon the SCSL to consider
the prospects for that institution in addressing key concerns for
that society. 23 4 I argued that the Court has significant shortcomings that may limit its ability to operate successfully or contribute
to the needs of that post-conflict country. 2 5 Furthermore, I suggested that the particular expectations placed upon the Court to
provide capacity-building and a broader legacy for the country's
judiciary may be unrealistic.2 3 6 I argue that trials in mixed tribunals, like those in purely domestic or international institutions,
are not necessarily a panacea, addressing all needs of societies
emerging from violence, repression, or war.

234. See supra notes 174-188 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 171-187 and accompanying text.

